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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-3383

PRIOR BEKITHEMBA MLAMBO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A97-965-727)
Immigration Judge: Honorable R.K. Malloy

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 30, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2008)

OPINION

PER CURIAM
Prior Bekithemba Mlambo petitions for review of a final order of removal of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the
petition for review.

Mlambo is a native and citizen of Zimbabwe who came to the United States in
January 2000 as a non-immigrant to attend a university. In December 2003, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a notice to appear charging that Mlambo
was subject to removal because he failed to maintain or comply with the conditions of
non-immigrant status under which he was admitted. Through counsel, Mlambo conceded
that he did not attend the university from May 31, 2000, until the present, and that he was
removable as charged. Mlambo applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
For the reasons set forth in the IJ’s decision, the IJ granted Mlambo withholding of
removal, finding that he was persecuted in Zimbabwe on account of a protected ground,
and that he would more likely than not suffer future persecution. Mlambo, however, was
unhappy with this form of relief because he was concerned that he would be unable to
have his family, who were living in the United Kingdom, join him here. Mlambo sought
asylum, but the IJ concluded that his asylum application, filed in October 2003, was
untimely.
The IJ rejected Mlambo’s argument that extraordinary circumstances excused him
from filing his application until October 2003. Mlambo testified that he became ill in
July 2000, that he was diagnosed with colon cancer in January 2001, and that he received
chemotherapy from April 2001 until August 2001. Mlambo’s cancer was in remission
from August 2001 until June 2004, when it returned. The IJ stated that she could
understand Mlambo’s delay in filing his asylum application based upon his diagnosis with
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a life-threatening disease, but she concluded that waiting until October 2003 to file was
unreasonable. The IJ stated that she would have considered the application timely filed if
Mlambo had applied by the end of 2001, four or five months after the cancer went into
remission.1
The BIA agreed that Mlambo did not file his application within a reasonable
period of time and dismissed his appeal. The BIA remanded the record to the IJ to
complete the necessary background and security checks related to the grant of
withholding of removal. Mlambo then moved for reconsideration of the BIA’s order,
arguing that the BIA did not consider certain arguments in his brief.2 The BIA granted
the motion and vacated its prior decision. The BIA, however, again concluded that
Mlambo’s asylum application was untimely and adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.
The BIA remanded the record to the IJ to complete the background checks related to the
grant of withholding of removal. The IJ then entered a final order denying asylum and
relief under the CAT and granting withholding of removal. This petition for review
followed.
We must first address our jurisdiction over the petition for review. The
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The IJ also stated in her decision that she would have found the application timely if
Mlambo had filed it within six months of August 2001, when his cancer went into
remission.
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Mlambo also filed a petition for review. In March 2007, we dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction because a final order had yet to be issued based on the BIA’s remand
of the record to the IJ.
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Government correctly argues that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim that an alien met
his or her burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances excuse the untimely filing
of an asylum application. Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir. 2006).
We may, however, entertain constitutional claims or questions of law. Jarbough v.
Attorney General, 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). As discussed below, Mlambo
presents colorable questions of law for our review. We thus deny the Government’s
motion to dismiss the petition for review.
Mlambo contends that at the outset of his hearing the IJ expressed the view,
contrary to the immigration regulations, that she would not consider his depression as an
excuse for his untimely asylum application. Mlambo notes that, under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.4(a)(5), extraordinary circumstances include a “[s]erious illness or mental or
physical disability. . .during the 1-year period after arrival[.]” Mlambo further contends
that, when his lawyer asked him about his depression, the IJ made clear that she found it
irrelevant.
We agree with the BIA that the record does not reflect that the IJ applied a rule
that depression can not constitute an extraordinary circumstance excusing an untimely
asylum application. In her decision, the IJ recognized that Mlambo’s illness “would have
a powerful impact on the psychological condition of the individual.” Joint App. at 23.
The IJ stated:
This is a life-threatening disease, and certainly an individual who is
diagnosed with such a life-threatening disease would be depressed, and so
the Court certainly can understand a delay in the filing of an application.
4

However, the issue in this case is how much time should the person be
allowed to hold off on the filing of an asylum application if he is suffering
from a serious illness? The respondent is still suffering from a serious
illness. Should the Court wait until the illness is either cured or goes into
permanent remission, if there is such a thing?
Joint App. at 23. The IJ then recounted the facts regarding Mlambo’s illness, including
his statement in his affidavit that he was severely depressed because he was here without
his family, and that people were telling him that he would probably not survive; his
statement at the asylum office that he did not fully recover until the latter half of 2002;
and his testimony that his cancer was in remission from August 2001 until June 2004.3
Mlambo argues that the IJ’s decision must be viewed in the context of her
statements at his hearing. The hearing transcript suggests that the IJ did not believe that
depression resulting from the separation from one’s family would constitute extraordinary
circumstances because that is a factor present in all cases. Joint App. at 82. When
Mlambo’s counsel argued that Mlambo’s depression resulted from his illness, the IJ
replied that he was asking for too much. Joint App. at 83. The IJ stated that she was
willing to give Mlambo a year beyond the deadline to file his application, but not two
years. The IJ noted that Mlambo had filed his application while he was still undergoing
treatment, and that he could have applied earlier. The transcript reflects that the IJ was
considering what was reasonable under the circumstances, and her decision makes clear
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The IJ also noted that Mlambo had stated at the asylum office that he delayed filing
his application because he did not know the asylum process. The IJ stated that such a
lack of knowledge did not warrant a waiver of the filing deadline.
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that those circumstances included Mlambo’s emotional state.4
Mlambo further argues that, when counsel tried to elicit testimony about his
depression on two occasions, the IJ’s responses demonstrated that she found such
testimony irrelevant. We disagree. Mlambo notes that, when counsel asked him whether
his diagnosis affected his emotional health, the IJ asked counsel to move on. Joint App.
at 138. The IJ, however, stated that the answer was obvious, implicitly recognizing that
such a diagnosis would have a negative effect. Mlambo also notes that, when counsel
asked Mlambo how he felt during the months after he stopped treatment until the time he
filed his asylum application, the IJ interrupted him. Joint App. at 139-40. The IJ did so,
however, in order to review the circumstances surrounding when he stopped treatment.
Mlambo then testified about his state of mind and what he was doing from the time he
stopped treatment until his cancer returned. Counsel then asked Mlambo why he did not
file his asylum application until October 2003, and Mlambo further testified about his
depressed state. Joint App. at 143.
We conclude that the IJ’s decision was not contrary to the regulations. The IJ
recognized Mlambo’s depressed state resulting from his cancer, but concluded that the
time that he waited to file was unreasonable, a conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to
review.
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Under the regulations, extraordinary circumstances may excuse the failure to file
within the 1-year period as long as the alien filed the application within a reasonable
period given those circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5) (emphasis added).
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Based on our decision that the IJ’s decision was in conformity with the law, we
find no error in the BIA’s decision not to refer this matter to a three-member panel. See
Purveegiin v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 684, 688 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing referrals to a threemember panel under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)).5
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
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The Government’s motion to summarily affirm the BIA’s decision in this regard,
which was referred to us for disposition, is denied as unnecessary.
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